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A changing Arctic 
Global politics today is marked by intensified rivalry between the United 
States and China, a strained and fractious relationship between Western states 
and Russia, and overall uncertainty about the robustness of regional and global 
order and alliances. Certainly, these elements of rivalry were at the forefront 
during then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s speech in advance of the 
2019 Arctic Council ministerial meeting. The speech highlighted, in the 
United States’ perspective, the need for further cooperation in the region, but 
called for Chinese and Russian actions to be viewed in a broader context: 
specifically, their perceived nefarious motives and actions on the global stage. 
The speech problematized Chinese engagement in Arctic politics and criticized 
Russia’s economic and concurrent military build-up, as well as its activities 
along the Northern Sea Route.1  
The decision to make such broad sweeping political statements prior to the 
Arctic Council meeting was out of the ordinary. The speech did serve to 
highlight the US administration’s position on the need to keep China’s further 
influence in the region in check. It should also be noted that the speech came at 
a time when the US and China’s relations were acutely stressed. These tensions 
will likely endure, but the public rhetoric may be less inflammatory and more 
nuanced, as mechanisms for better managing these tensions are approached in a 
manner that may make it less costly for all parties. The Biden administration is 
expected to have a more multilateralism-friendly approach to global governance 
and be a more predictable and engaged partner for allied states than the Trump 
administration. This new approach will be most evident in regard to climate 
change, shared interests in the rule of law, and a reemphasis on the importance 
of institutionalized governance regimes throughout the Arctic. However, the 
concern for checking China’s and Russia’s influence in global economic and 
security politics – and in the Arctic specifically – is widely shared across both 
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parties in the United States. Engaging an increasingly interested China in the 
Arctic, and managing relations of both cooperation and deterrence with Russia, 
are frequently-considered issues in European Arctic policy circles as well.  
Meanwhile, scientists are increasingly worried about the speed and scale of 
the transformative impacts of climate change on the Arctic. A 2019 update 
assessment2 issued by the AMAP (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme) Arctic Council working group, which brings together scientists 
and governmental officials from Arctic and non-Arctic states, highlighted that 
the region: 
• Continues to warm at a rate more than twice that of the global mean 
• Has had annual surface air temperatures during the last five years that 
exceeded those of any year since 1900 
• Experienced a decline of 75% since 1979 in the volume of Arctic sea 
ice present in the month of September  
It is worth noting that the drivers of climate change are global greenhouse gas 
emissions, rather than regional activities. Likewise, the changes in the Arctic, 
and the melting of the ice caps, will have global implications far beyond the 
region.  
One could assume that some states or actors are more likely to assertively 
protect their interests and expand their strategic influence in order to maximize 
gains and minimize losses against the backdrop of such a rapidly changing 
Arctic environment. Media headlines frequently proclaim the Arctic to be in 
the grips of a ‘New Cold War,’ or describe the region as cooking over with 
competition in a militarized ‘Hot Arctic.’ And, indeed, several states have been 
investing in new, or revitalizing existing, military assets and capacities that they 
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deem critical to ensuring their interests in the Arctic. 
There are also numerous trends and events that demonstrate a 
commitment to cooperation and joint solutions to common challenges. For 
example, in 2018, the Arctic coastal states (Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Norway, Russia, and the USA) and key fishing nations (Iceland, South Korea, 
China, Japan, and the European Union (EU)) concluded the Agreement to 
Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean. This 
agreement establishes a precautionary and sustainable harvesting approach to 
Arctic Ocean fisheries, should they ever become commercially viable.  
This short chapter reviews some key factors and drivers supporting and 
challenging stability in the Arctic region. It was initially published as 
background for discussion at the Arctic Security Roundtable at the Munich 
Security Conference 2020.  
What supports Arctic stability?  
Research on Arctic governance and cooperation highlights several different 
and important factors that undergird a cooperative approach to the region and 
regional stability. These include: 
• Adherence to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and other 
related agreements supported by global maritime organizations 
• Active participation by key Arctic actors in circumpolar/Northern 
political institutions and the development of regionally-specific 
agreements 
• Growing and interconnected economic interests 
• Regional ties and networks that challenge purely national approaches 
to Arctic issues 
 
 To a large degree, the Arctic is defined by the Arctic Ocean. International 
law, more specifically the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), provides a significant and comprehensive governance 
framework.  
Although the United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS, it is important 
to note that the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration – issued by the Arctic coastal states 
together – underscored a commitment to using international law to ensure the 
peaceful governance of the region. Arctic and non-Arctic states have also 
utilized the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to find common 
ground and negotiate the Polar Code, which is an international code to ensure 
and enhance safety regimes for maritime and shipping operations in the polar 
regions.  
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There are several organizations that enable and enhance data-driven and 
policy-relevant efforts in and throughout the Arctic. The eight-country Arctic 
Council, established in 1997, is a consensus-driven forum for considering 
Arctic issues. Non-Arctic states, Indigenous communities, and non-
governmental organizations are also involved as observers to the Council. A 
number of Arctic Council working groups engage in substantive research and 
analysis to develop a shared knowledge base for data-driven circumpolar 
policymaking. 
It is of particular importance to note that the Arctic Council does not 
address Arctic security matters; these issues have been the topic of consideration 
at various international forums, including previous Munich Security 
Conference Arctic Security Roundtables.  
While the Arctic Chiefs of Defence meetings were suspended in light of 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum was established 
in 2016 and has become a key venue for coordination on soft or ‘civil’ security 
concerns in the region. 
In the European Arctic, there is a web of multilateral and bilateral 
arrangements for cooperation between Russia and the Nordic countries. The 
multilateral Euro-Arctic Barents Region was established in 1993, with Russia, 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland as core partners. There are also substantive 
bilateral ties, including the IMO-approved agreement between the US and 
Russia to more effectively manage maritime traffic in the Bering Strait.  
Various cooperative efforts have resulted in a series of legally binding Arctic 
agreements that address regional challenges (see Table 2-1). The Central Arctic 
Ocean fisheries prevention agreement, concluded in 2018 and mentioned 
above, is especially noteworthy in that it brought together the Arctic coastal 
states and many non-Arctic states with substantial fishing interests, such as 
China and the EU, into a productive conversation about regional governance. 
The Arctic region has a number of promising avenues for expanded 
economic development, including extending the more established sectors of 
mining, petroleum extraction, fishing, tourism, and shipping, as well as novel 
pursuits associated with the burgeoning blue economy (renewables, 
bioprospecting, and deep-sea mining). Most of the resource base for such 
expanded economic activities is found within clearly demarcated national 
boundaries. Still, many of these resources and opportunities have a 
transnational element, be it migrating fish stocks or managing shipping traffic 
and tourism through and out of the region. New economic opportunities with a 
joint or transboundary nature can cause tensions, as we explore below, but can 
also contribute to stability between Arctic states, if governed correctly. 
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Table 2-1: Recently concluded Arctic regional agreements 
Agreement on Year concluded Chaired by 
Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic   
2011 Norway, Russia, USA  
Cooperation on Marine 
Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic 




2017 Russia, USA 
International Agreement 
to Prevent Unregulated 
High Seas Fisheries in 
the Central Arctic Ocean 
2018 USA 
 
Figure 2-1: Map of the zones established by the 2011 agreement ‘Cooperation 
on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic.’ 
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The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission is one example of 
how joint economic interest contributes to stability between Arctic states. 
Established in the mid-1970s to oversee the management of the valuable fish 
stocks in the Barents Sea, among them the world’s largest cod stock, the regime 
has proven its robustness throughout the Cold War and post-Crimea tensions. 
The two parties have persistently stood together in times of conflict with third 
states, and they have explicitly shielded this bilateral arena from other political 
complexities. It can be argued that experiences from fisheries management have 
had a ‘positive spill-over’ effect. The result is both healthy fish stock and fairly 
robust bilateral political relations.  
Finally, circumpolar connections across the Arctic have been drivers in 
bringing about and stabilizing Arctic cooperation. Most notably, the activism 
and sustained efforts of the Indigenous peoples of the region – many of whom 
have traditional homelands that cut across Arctic state borders – have 
highlighted the interconnection of the Arctic region and the need for holistic 
regional governance approaches. Appreciation of the interconnectedness of 
Arctic ecosystems is a critical factor in motivating the scientific research that 
supports knowledge-based policymaking in the Arctic Council and in relevant 
states.  
Key challenges for continued Arctic stability? 
In the following, we identify key drivers that might challenge Arctic 
stability and security. These include: 
• More demanding security dynamics between key actors in the Arctic  
• Geopolitical dynamics between Arctic and non-Arctic states 
• Differing approaches to Arctic economic development and the 
deployment and use of new technologies 
 
Arctic security is to a large extent dependent on, or a by-product of, how 
various key states view the strategic significance of the Arctic in a larger 
geopolitical context and manage regional security dynamics. Several Arctic 
countries have recently increased, or planned to increase, their military activity 
and capabilities in the Arctic, and are engaged in active policy review on Arctic 
security issues. 
Russia – the largest Arctic state – has long had a significant Arctic military 
presence. The protection of military assets placed in the Arctic is fundamental 
to Russia’s security strategy, including maintaining second-strike capability and 
thus deterrence. Even as Russia faces constraints on its overall budget, and 
maintains a high-level political commitment to Arctic regional peace in keeping 
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with the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, the country is increasing its military 
investment in the region. It has expanded its icebreaker fleet, renovated and 
expanded Soviet-era military bases, built new bases, and announced plans to 
deploy new weapons systems in the Far North. Importantly, Russia has also 
begun operating and exercising further west. For instance, in August 2019, 
Russia conducted its largest naval exercise since the Cold War, the Ocean 
Shield. A central purpose of the exercise, it seems, was to demonstrate Russian 
military might in the region, convey a position of strength and capability, and 
message the strong deterrent capabilities that NATO would encounter if it 
ventured into the Arctic through the Norwegian Sea north of Iceland.  
NATO has sought to train and demonstrate capacity in ways that are firm 
but not escalatory. For example, NATO’s high-visibility Exercise Trident 
Juncture, which was conducted in Norway in 2018, provided the Alliance with 
valuable experience in conducting an Article 5 operation on the northern flank. 
The exercise included some 50,000 troops from 31 nations, including Sweden 
and Finland. Importantly, the exercise took place in southern and central 
Norway, far away from the Russian border, to signal restraint to Russia. 
Nonetheless, if Russia keeps pushing its activities further west, increased 
NATO presence northeast of Iceland may be required as a counter-signalling 
measure. 
In sum, we observe recent direct changes in military posturing in the 
Arctic. Increased military presence in the area does not necessarily mean 
increased risk or an escalation of threats; it is only natural that a changing 
Arctic requires the ability to police and monitor the regional activity, including 
fulfilling obligations for search and rescue.  
From a security perspective, however, it is important that military 
developments are balanced, transparent, and predictable. Sufficient steps must 
be taken to ensure good communication, rules of engagement, and the 
avoidance of brinkmanship and accidents. In order to cope with increased 
military presence, the parties must be particularly sensitive to how new 
technologies, new generations of weapons systems, and military postures might 
trigger unwanted escalatory dynamics and accidents.  
The security situation in the Arctic is also likely to be affected by dynamics 
between Arctic and non-Arctic states and actors. The Arctic region has, during 
the last decade, generated considerable attention from a range of actors, public 
and private. Increased awareness to the challenges and changes in the Arctic is 
in general good, and increases our ability to solve common problems. However, 
it also represents some new challenges. The Arctic countries have to be aware 
that when new actors enter the region, it has the potential to affect the various 
and complex webs of bilateral relations that exist in the area. This has the 
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potential to place additional pressure on the current international and regional 
governance system. 
One of the non-Arctic actors that has most clearly stressed its Arctic 
ambitions is China. Recent Chinese actions include a self-proclaimed status as a 
‘near Arctic state,’ enhancing its capabilities in Arctic maritime operations, 
shipping and research, and demonstrating its interest in expanding its 
investment in infrastructure throughout the region as part of its Belt and Road 
Initiative, known as the ‘Polar Silk Road.’ In 2018, China issued a white paper 
on Arctic policy.3 While the white paper highlighted a commitment to 
international law as the basis of Arctic governance, uncertainty has been created 
by China’s position on international law and actions in the South China Sea, 
including its claiming of territory throughout the region and establishment of 
military bases on a string of islands (reinforced by military assets). 
Washington has objected to China’s proclaimed status as a ‘near Arctic 
state,’ and has suggested that China may use economic development to 
influence the region’s future governance and as a possible precursor to military 
expansionism. Additionally, China’s investment and economic development 
interests in Greenland have heightened these concerns for not only the US, but 
other Arctic states as well.  
Finally, there could be tensions resulting from different expectations about 
the tempo, extent, and type of economic development in the region. While 
most parties today agree on the need for the sustainable development of the 
region and are committed to the precautionary principle, the extent and type of 
large-scale Arctic economic development are debated.  
The tension between a conservation approach and a sustainable 
development approach in the Arctic has been long evident in regional 
governance, as well as in the domestic politics of Arctic states. For example, the 
Obama administration’s joint ban with Canada on exploration and 
development in the Arctic Ocean and sovereign US Arctic waters was seen in a 
positive light by many audiences, but as a betrayal of regional and local 
economic expectations by others. The Trump administration viewed the 
American Arctic, Alaska, as an important component of the country’s energy 
security equation, underscored by support for offshore oil drilling and the 
opening up for development of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge along 
Alaska’s North Slope. This was a stark departure from the previous US 
administration, and the contentious set of decisions rippled through the US 
and indeed the international environmental community. The Biden 
administration has already brought about policy changes more in line with 
Obama-era policies in this regard.  
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In other sectors, like fisheries, a changing Arctic climate may stress existing 
governance structures. Living marine resources are abundant in (sub-) Arctic 
waters. There are indications that fish stocks are moving northwards as a result 
of increases in water temperature, and existing management regimes will be 
challenged to address this rapidly changing reality. This has, for instance, 
happened in the Norwegian Sea, where established management structures 
between Arctic states such as Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, as well as the 
EU, have broken down. Brexit further complicates the picture. It should be 
noted, however, that commercial fishing is not yet an issue in the Central Arctic 
Ocean, and hardly will be in the foreseeable future. None of the currently 
exploited fish stocks can live on the bottom floor of the deep sea, although not 
yet known resources in the water column might be exploited if new catch 
technologies are developed.  
Against a changing physical landscape, new technologies for identifying, 
monitoring, and exploiting ocean resources – from bioprospecting to deep-sea 
mining – will surely bring both new opportunities and unforeseen 
consequences. In order to ensure the good governance of the Arctic, it is 
therefore important that leaders overcome coordination challenges, remain 
committed to knowledge-based decision-making, and maintain a governance 
regime that ensures high standards and compliance. These are essential steps in 
avoiding the so-called tragedy of the commons when managing transboundary or 
common resources.  
Towards a proactive Arctic security discussion 
Many government officials, military leaders, and political observers have 
proclaimed the rise of a new, post-Cold War global great power competition 
between the United States, Russia, and China, with myriad implications. We 
suggest that the increasingly open and globalized Arctic does indeed present 
some challenges, but considering these challenges and their potential solutions 
is not well served by relying on narratives or practices of strategic competition 
alone. Continued dialogue is needed about how to best meet emerging 
governance challenges and how to avoid unfortunate/unintended ‘tipping 
points’ in regional dynamics that may prove difficult and costly for regional 
actors. As a basis for such an ongoing dialogue, we suggest policymakers 
consider the following points: 
Security dynamics in an interconnected region and beyond:  
• The Arctic is more peaceful than many other regions in the world. 
There is a promising track record of governance cooperation in the 
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region that serves as a basis for pursuing sustainable management for 
and peace in this ‘emerging’ ocean. However, the region is not 
immune to future tension and conflict points, in part due to its vast, 
important, and rapidly changing environment.  
• The Arctic environment is heating at more than twice the global 
average rate due to global climate change. This has global impacts. For 
context, the Arctic Ocean is 1.5 times the size of the United States and 
half the size of the African continent.  
• There is a risk that the changing global order, the intensified 
geopolitical rivalry between the US and China, and more turbulent 
relations between Europe and the US can ‘spill over’ from these and 
other arenas to the Arctic region. Against a broader backdrop of 
distrust and diminished military contact and communication across 
the NATO-Russia divide, there exists a risk that smaller 
miscalculations, accidents, and incorrect interpretations regarding 
military motives and activities can escalate into broader conflict.  
• The post-Cold War growth of Arctic cooperative governance occurred 
alongside an enduring NATO-Russia security rivalry. This 
‘cooperation in conflict’ approach to achieving national and collective 
interests has been more attainable in the Arctic than elsewhere, in large 
part due to the inherent interconnectedness of the Arctic ecosystem; 
the transnational circumpolar connections of the region’s Indigenous 
peoples, communities, and policy networks; and the limited (until 
recently) economic development opportunities and global/non-Arctic 
interest in the region. 
Economic development and a more trafficked Arctic:  
• A more trafficked and economically significant Arctic region in the 
decades to come is more than plausible. The prospect of a seasonally 
ice-free Arctic brings new strategic importance and economic 
possibilities to the region. Arctic states and other global actors are 
reconsidering the region in the development or refinement of their 
security, economic, and foreign policy strategies. 
• The changing physical nature of the region has triggered Arctic 
leadership, in several binding regional agreements, to govern novel and 
increased activity. Much of the Arctic is also governed by existing 
international law and regimes. As the Arctic Ocean opens, it is 
important to build on current international legal regimes and 
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structures, and get the management and policy structure ‘right’ to 
meet new regional challenges and activities.  
A need for the active maintenance of cooperative practices: 
• Leaders must continue to address the challenges to regional stability in 
the Arctic and take steps to mitigate and manage risks. Awareness of 
political ‘tipping points’ – points beyond which cooperation in 
national and collective interest will be rendered too difficult – and 
active consideration of how regional stability can best be maintained 




This chapter is based on a report originally published by the Munich Security 




1 US State Department. Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus. 
Speech delivered by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. May 6, 2019. Available 
online at: https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/, 
accessed 2 February 2020. 
2 AMAP. 2019. Arctic Climate Change Update. Available online at: 
https://www.amap.no/documents/download/3295/inline, accessed 20 January 
2020. 
3 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. January 
2018. China’s Arctic Policy. Available online (in English): 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_2814760266
60336.htm, accessed 4 February 2020. 
 
